Doing Justice to Patients with Dementia in ICU Triage by Vinay, Rasita et al.








Doing Justice to Patients with Dementia in ICU Triage
Vinay, Rasita ; Baumann, Holger ; Biller-Andorno, Nikola
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2021.1980147





Vinay, Rasita; Baumann, Holger; Biller-Andorno, Nikola (2021). Doing Justice to Patients with Dementia
in ICU Triage. The American Journal of Bioethics, 21(11):71-74.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2021.1980147
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=uajb20
The American Journal of Bioethics
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uajb20
Doing Justice to Patients with Dementia in ICU
Triage
Rasita Vinay, Holger Baumann & Nikola Biller-Andorno
To cite this article: Rasita Vinay, Holger Baumann & Nikola Biller-Andorno (2021) Doing Justice
to Patients with Dementia in ICU Triage, The American Journal of Bioethics, 21:11, 71-74, DOI:
10.1080/15265161.2021.1980147
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2021.1980147
Published online: 28 Oct 2021.
Submit your article to this journal 
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
CONCLUSION
We welcome and applaud Wilkinson’s excellent dis-
cussion of the pros and cons of using consideration of
frailty in pandemic-driven triage protocols. We object
to the very idea of using life-years-saved or longevity
as a criterion for rationing, because of its intrinsic
relationship to both ageism and ableism. But we
accept and welcome the use of frailty diagnoses in
rationing, to the extent that such diagnoses are tied to
odds of surviving to discharge, or to surviving only
for very short periods after discharge. Beyond such
short-term considerations, the reversibility of frailty in
many cases, and the lack of data about reversibility
among the younger frail, militate against the use of
frailty as a triage criterion.
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Doing Justice to Patients with Dementia in ICU Triage
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In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, countries
around the world developed ICU triaging guidelines
(J€obges and Biller-Andorno 2020). One important
point of convergence was an explicit commitment to
avoid discrimination based on age, disability and
social factors (J€obges et al. 2020). However, what this
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commitment amounts to and what exactly constitutes
unjust discrimination in specific cases is a matter of
ongoing controversy. In this comment, we will probe
the question how we can do justice to patients with
dementia in ICU triage.
It is interesting to note how guidelines struggle with
this issue. For instance, the first versions of the Swiss
guidelines listed severe and moderate dementia within
the general exclusion criteria, this was later removed in
revisions made in November 2020 to avoid possible
constitutional discrimination. At the same time, the
Clinical Frailty Scale (CFS) was introduced as a tool for
assessing short-term medical prognosis, which then led
to concerns about unjust discrimination. It was argued
that using the CFS—a clinical tool used to assess the
care and support needs of elderly persons—for triaging
runs the danger of excluding individuals even with
moderate dementia, because of their increased need for
everyday support due to their mental condition
(Alzheimer Switzerland 2021).1 How are we to evaluate
such concerns, and how does Wilkinson’s paper help us
to understand them better?
Frailty and Discrimination
In the first part of his paper, Wilkinson (2021) elabo-
rates that frailty has been linked to three “potentially
highly relevant variables for triage decisions: probability
of survival, longevity and quality of life” (55). For this
reason, he contends, using the CFS is not (unjustly) dis-
criminatory. Unjust discrimination would only occur if
criteria such as age or severe dementia were directly
used as exclusion criteria, since they are not linked to
survival, longevity, or quality of life in the same way
that frailty is. Are allegations about discrimination mis-
guided then if dementia is not directly appealed to?
To establish the claim that using frailty is not
unjustly discriminatory, it must first be shown that
the three variables which frailty is linked to are not
themselves—either on their own or in combination—
unjustly discriminatory. While Wilkinson is aware of
this point, he does not address it directly and instead
refers to the different variables at different points of
his discussion. In general, he seems to suggest that it
is a potential advantage and part of the justification
for using frailty that it can be linked to many variables
(e.g., 11). Such justifications could potentially obscure
discussions about discrimination, and we would sug-
gest to first discuss the different variables independ-
ently before explicitly examining how they relate to
each other. For example, many guidelines used short-
term survival as a primary criterion, and other criteria
such as age or quality of life were used as tie-breaker
in cases of similar short-term prognosis (Vinay,
Baumann, and Biller-Andorno 2021). Wilkinson does
not provide such a framework or hierarchy.
Wilkinson also suggests that using “quality of life”
on its own is often problematic and can lead to discrim-
ination (56). Like many other bioethicists, we share the
view that considerations about quality of life should not
be used as a criterion in triage guidelines (although,
such considerations may play an important role in a
patient’s decision toward ICU treatment). Wilkinson is
more positive about using longevity or “life-years left”
as a criterion, stating that it has intuitive appeal and can
draw on considerations about fairness (life-cycle
approach), even though some have argued against such
approaches. Most of the time, Wilkinson refers to the
least controversial criterion in his discussion of discrim-
ination: survival/short-term survival. This variable has
been employed as a primary criterion in many triaging
guidelines, which brings us to question whether frailty
can be justified by appealing to its relation to short-
term survival, and therefore avoids unjust discrimin-
ation in the case of dementia patients.
Frailty, Short-Term Survival and Unjust
Discrimination
The first question to be asked is whether using short-
term survival as a criterion for triage constitutes unjust
discrimination. We share Wilkinson’s view that short-
term medical prognosis as a primary criterion in triage
is justified holistically and pragmatically as the criterion
that best reconciles different moral values in triage. We
also believe that although triage protocols should not
further disadvantage vulnerable populations, emergency
situations such as a pandemic are not the place to rem-
edy already existing inequalities and injustices (Reid
2020). More specifically, suggestions proposing the pri-
oritization of persons from certain social backgrounds
over those from wealthier backgrounds, despite short-
term prognosis, are ethically problematic on grounds of
domain-specific fairness and the principle of maximizing
benefits. At the same time, it should be emphasized that
a pandemic and ICU rationing reminds and requires us
to renew our commitment and moral obligation to
address social justice issues and to give special attention
1The Alzheimer’s society in UK also published a statement requesting
NICE guidelines to avoid using the Clinical Frailty Score for triaging
dementia patients, and instead ensuring that clinicians perform a holistic
assessment to ensure dementia patients are not disadvantaged in
receiving the right care because of their labelled condition (Alzheimer’s
Society 2021. https://www.alzheimers.org.uk/news/2020-03-30/critical-care-
people-dementia-during-coronavirus-pandemic).
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to vulnerable groups. For the context of our discussion,
the following relation is important: If frailty is robustly
linked to short-term survival, its use in ICU triage does
not constitute an unjust discrimination, since short-
term survival cannot be regarded as being unjustly
discriminatory.
The second question to be asked is whether frailty
(and its clinical assessment) is in fact reliably linked to
short-term survival across patient groups. After all, the
use of the CFS might work for some groups of
patients but not for others. Wilkinson explicitly refers
to this possibility, mentioning, e.g., that frailty in
younger persons does not reduce the probability of
short-term survival in the same way as in old persons,
but only in relativity to the group of young persons.2
However, Wilkinson does not seem to regard such
differences as a general problem for using frailty in
ICU triage. By contrast, we argue that this issue and
the accompanying danger of (implicit) unjust discrim-
ination needs to be addressed, since it potentially
undermines the normative justification and practical
relevance of using the CFS in ICU triage.
Doing Justice to Patients with Dementia
Not using dementia as an explicit exclusion criterion
for triage is certainly a step toward avoiding discrim-
ination. However, using a CFS can be seen as a win-
dow-dressing if the relationship between frailty and
the chosen primary criterion, such as short-term prog-
nosis, is not robust. In this case, it can be questioned
if the assumption that the degree of dementia gener-
ally corresponds to the degree of frailty, justifies the
use of CFS as a triaging tool rather than as a clinical
assessment of care needs (Rockwood and Theou
2020). For instance, the current Swiss triaging guide-
lines use a CFS of 7 and above (“severely frail”) in
combination with an age over 65, as well as a CFS of
6 and above (“moderately frail”) in combination with
an age over 85, as exclusion criterion for ICU admis-
sion (Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences 2021).3 This
means that a 66-year-old person with severe dementia,
completely dependent on personal care but physically
stable and not at high risk of dying within the next
six months, will not be considered for ICU treatment.
While there may be good arguments with views to
quality-of-life-related outcomes and the burden of
treatment for the patient, it is not obvious how this
exclusion criterion relates to short-term prognosis.
Triaging guidelines have the potential to play an
important role in safeguarding fair allocation not only
in the current pandemic, but also in future public
health crises. It is therefore worthwhile to continue
refining the guidance that has emerged in the recent
past, often in a remarkable effort over a short period
of time. A well-argued choice of allocation criteria
that are consistently operationalized, and assessment
tests or procedures that do not unfairly disadvantage
groups such as persons living with dementia, will con-
tribute significantly to emergency preparedness and
societal resilience.
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Wilkinson (2021) argues that the use of frailty scores
in ICU triage does not necessarily involve discrimin-
ation on the basis of disability. In support of this
argument, he claims, “it is not the disability per se
that the score is measuring—rather it is the underly-
ing physiological and physical vulnerability” (55).
While we appreciate the attention Wilkinson explicitly
pays to disability in this piece, we find his use of the
distinction between disability and underlying vulner-
ability untenable both theoretically and practically.
We begin with a brief overview of research in philoso-
phy of disability concerning the meaning of the con-
cept itself. We argue that this research demonstrates
that many forms of disability do not involve underly-
ing vulnerabilities, and, furthermore, that Wilkinson
equivocates between “disability” understood as a med-
ical category vs. “disability” understood as a feature of
lived experience. We reject Wilkinson’s distinction on
these grounds and offer further considerations to
avoid disability discrimination in emergency and crisis
standards of care contexts.
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH ON THE CONCEPT
OF DISABILITY
Over the last thirty years, our understanding of the
philosophy of disability has grown exponentially
(Cureton and Wasserman 2020). Elizabeth Barnes’
2016 book The Minority Body marked a watershed
moment by placing a decisive nail in the coffin of bad
difference views of disability. Bad difference views hold
that disability is by itself (a) something that makes
one worse off; and (b) would still be “bad” even if
society was fully accommodating of disabled people
(Barnes 2016, 50). She instead defends a mere
difference view of disability on which “having a
disability is something that makes you different, but
not something that by itself makes you worse off
because of that difference” (Idem, 78, our italics). This
does not mean that certain disabilities cannot engen-
der negative consequences; on the contrary, that is
certainly true. Her claim is instead about the pruden-
tial value of disability in general. Since the book’s
release, the field has considered and deliberated upon
Barnes’ arguments. Tellingly, the bad difference view
of disability has continued to be broadly rejected, but
there remains significant disagreement about the mere
difference view. Barnes purposely limits her account
to physical disabilities, and, unsurprisingly, most find
it far less fitting as an account of many psychological
disabilities. Others argue that conditions such as
chronic pain challenge the mere-difference view on its
own terms and are exceptions that should instead be
understood as bad difference forms of disability
(Campbell and Stramondo 2017).
THE LIVED EXPERIENCES OF DISABILITY
We will not take a side in this debate here. We have
instead cursorily summarized the last five-plus years
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